Sociopolitical

Re-examining Taiwan Strait assumptions

"Reshaping the Taiwan Strait," by John J.Tkacik Jr., 2007. Published by Heritage Books, 222 pages. ISBN: 9780891952756

• Publication Date：11/06/2009
• Source： Taiwan Today
• By  Philip Courtenay

The 180 kilometer-wide strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China is, in political terms, probably the most sensitive stretch of water in Asia, if not in the world. The Taiwan Strait has been the setting for several military confrontations between the mainland and Taiwan since the last days of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 when the forces of the former Kuomintang Nationalist government relocated on its final island stronghold. The political sensitivity has been enhanced by the involvement of the United States in the confrontation between the mainland and the island which instigated the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the KMT government on Taiwan in December 1954 and the adoption of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.

The issue of the Taiwan Strait has generated a substantial literature of which “Reshaping the Taiwan Strait,” published in 2007 by The Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based conservative think tank, is one of the more recent. The volume, edited by John Tkacik Jr., at the time senior fellow in Asian studies at the foundation, is a collection of essays, many of which emerged from a symposium on the topic held in September 2005, and whose nine contributors are drawn primarily from policy research centers and universities in the United States but with two from Australia.

Since the symposium and the publication of the essays, significant political changes have taken place in the United States, Australia and Taiwan itself as the results of national elections that have returned former opposition parties to power. Although neither the United States nor Australia has made policy changes relating specifically to the Taiwan issue, new attitudes on the broader international stage will be relevant. And, of course, Taiwan’s own position on cross-strait relations has changed dramatically. Nevertheless the book, which Tkacik’s introduction describes as “aiming to provide constructive criticism of existing policies, offer useful policy alternatives, and examine where the Taiwan Strait conundrum fits into the China challenge,” still raises significant issues. The offering of “useful policy alternatives” is particularly relevant.

In its examination of the Taiwan Strait conundrum, three main issues are considered, namely security, mainland China’s claim to sovereignty and the “one-China” policy. All remain, though the political changes of the last 18 months or so are likely to alter attitudes towards the emphases given them.

The security issue focuses on the strategic and defense effects of the emergence of mainland China, which appears strongly as the major priority of the essays. The longest is headed “Strategy Deficit: U.S. Security in the Pacific and the Future of Taiwan,” and a selection of its sub-headings — e.g. “A Lack of Strategy” and “Taiwan in America’s Asia Strategy” — provides a clear guide to its major concern and exemplifies the impression that the maintenance of “America’s strategic posture in the Western Pacific” (Page 55) is more a reason for its unease over the status of Taiwan than the preservation of the island’s self-determination and democracy. This impression is reinforced later by the statement (Page 106) that “in Washington, the top priority of a new cross-strait policy must be America’s interests.”

The “one-China” principle, which states that the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of mainland China, including Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, receives considerable coverage in the book, where it is described as anachronistic (Page 93), and is the underlying theme of two chapters. Since all countries seeking diplomatic relations with the mainland must acknowledge this policy and refrain from maintaining official relations with Taiwan, much of the discussion involves consideration of a policy alternative to the continuing U.S. acknowledgement of the principle.

The Heritage Foundation’s 2005 symposium and this emerging set of essays took place during the period in office of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan which did not agree with the one-China principle and stated that Taiwan and China are two separate countries. Since then the presidential election win in March 2008 by Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT has eased the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China and led to historic talks aimed at consolidating a dramatic rapprochement and building trade ties. They agreed to set up their first-ever offices in each other’s territories and later established direct cross-strait air and sea links. By May 2009, Beijing and Taipei had signed nine agreements on economic cooperation, including deals on direct flights and other trade deals.

This political change in Taiwan has made it possible to move closer to the suggestions mooted in two of the shorter essays in the volume but which are the most significant. Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, they are contributed by the two Australian authors, who can be expected to have their own distinctive regional and geo-political viewpoint on the Taiwan Strait conundrum.

The first of the two chapters begins with the statement that “a paradigm shift is required in order to deal with the Taiwan problem.” It goes on to make the case that most analysis of the problem appears to proceed from a small number of largely unexamined premises. Chief among these is that mainland China will never give up its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan — but also, and crucially, that mainland China has a right to such sovereignty and would be humiliated or would suffer a loss of prestige should it fail to insist on “recovering” this sovereignty (Page 147).

This paradigm shift is said to require the re-examination of three assumptions: that Taiwan is, as a matter of historical and international legality, an inalienable part of mainland China; that mainland China will not, under any circumstances, accept the independence of Taiwan; and that mainland China is a rising strategic competitor of the United States in Eurasia. The chapter moves on to argue concisely and plausibly that these claims are more tenuous than repetition “connives to make them appear.” A detailed examination of the limited historical Chinese control over Taiwan concludes that “clearly, China’s claims to Taiwan have no historical basis.”

The common argument that runs through both chapters is described as a counter-intuitive insight which may offer the basis for a solution. The historical evidence, it is reasoned, suggests that mainland China’s national interest and dignity could be better served by coming to terms with the fact that Taiwan has been juridically separate from the Chinese mainland for at least 100 of the past 110 years as well as with the fact of Taiwan’s current de facto independence, and by developing a new, non-sovereign relationship with it. This would involve making a sound case that Taiwanese independence is perfectly consistent with mainland China’s national dignity and that avoiding hostilities over the matter is vitally important to mainland China’s enduring national interests.

Such an outcome, it is claimed, would yield four major advantages to China — conversion of Taiwan from an enemy (or, at best, a wary neighbor) into a friend; removal of a serious cause of tension and misunderstanding with the United States; a reduction in apprehension by countries all over Asia about the rise of mainland China with a positive reaction to its vision and self-confidence; and the commencement of a constructive dialogue with Taiwan about careful moves to bring about political reform in mainland China.

It is suggested that U.S. cross-strait policy should be a commitment to a peaceful outcome implying two necessary corollaries — that the United States will not formally recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, and will work actively to promote a significant international personality for Taiwan based on its development as a de facto — but not de jure — independent democratic entity.

Despite its offering less attention to possible policies for the “reshaping” than to historical and strategic issues, “Reshaping the Taiwan Strait” is nevertheless a thorough record of the development and complexities of the so-called “Taiwan Strait conundrum” and the emphasis on a paradigm shift alone justifies its addition to the current literature, especially perhaps in the changed political situation.

—Philip Courtenay is a free-lance writer based in Queensland, Australia.
Copyright © 2009 by Philip Courtenay

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