Taiwan Today

The party line and objectives of propaganda motivate the historians of mainland China. Truth and objectivity have no place in their value system The Chinese Communists have been attempting to rewrite Chinese history since 1949 in their compilation of the "History of the Republic of China." This effort began at the "Institute of Modern History" under the "Academy of Social Sciences" when Mao Tse-tung ordered the writing of three works: a history of the Chinese Communist party, a history of imperialist invasion of China and a history of the Republic of China. On July 28 of 1951, Kuo Mo-juo proposed his "six plans" at the convention of the Chinese Communist History Society, urging historians to stress the study of modern history rather than ancient history. The results were unsatisfactory. So on March 10, 1958, the Chinese Communists initiated another movement to favor modern history over ancient history. Historians were asked not to consider the three dynasties of Hsia, Shang and Chou as their ivory tower and not to "honor ancient history." At the end of 1958, the Chinese Communist "Ministry of Education" and "Institute of History" under the "Academy of Social Sciences" held a joint meeting in Peiping to discuss the problems of compiling commentaries on "contemporary Chinese history" and of collecting, examining and arranging contemporary historical materials. Sun Szu-pai, one of the chief editors of "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," wrote an article explaining points raised and decisions reached at the meeting. These points and decisions expressed the central thought in the Chinese Communist compilation of "contemporary Chinese history." The history of the Republic of China undoubtedly should be a part of "contemporary Chinese history," but Chinese Communist historians regard it as a part of "modern Chinese history." Their so-called "contemporary Chinese history" includes only the history of Chinese Communist party from the May Fourth Movement to the present. They call this the "history of Chinese revolution." In demarcating between "modern Chinese history" and "contemporary Chinese history," the Chinese Communists raised the problem of periods in modern Chinese history. When Hu Sheng published his 1954 article "The Problems of Periods in Modern Chinese History" in "History Study," many mainland historians expressed their opinions. Among these, that of Li Hsin was representative. His views on periods of modern Chinese history, set forth below, became the guideline for Chinese Communist compilation of modern Chinese history. Modern Chinese history (1840-1949). First part—The period of the old democratic revolution (1840-1919). First division (1840-1864). Foreign capitalist invasion and farmers' revolutionary war. Second division (1864-1895). Formation of semicolonial and semifeudal orders. Third division (1895-1905). The widening of the class crisis and the rise of the people's patriotic movement. Fourth division (1905-1919). The rise and fall of bourgeois revolutions. Second part—The period of the new democratic revolution (1919-1949). First division (1919-1927). The beginning of new democraticism and the first revolutionary civil war. Second division (1927-1937). The second revolutionary civil war. Third division (1937-1945). The War of Resistance Against Japan. Fourth division (1945-1949). The third revolutionary civil war. This categorization reveals two important points: first, modern Chinese history began in 1840 and ended in 1949, and, second, it was divided into the "old democratic period" and the "new democratic period" on a basis of Mao Tse-tung's thinking. The revolutions led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen were included in the "old democratic period" and were called "bourgeois revolutions." The wars launched by National Government after 1927 to quell Communist rebellions were called the first, second and third revolutionary civil wars. Once the field of study had been blocked out, mainland historians began writing the history of the Republic of China. The Chinese Communist Wen Hui Pao revealed that in 1956, when Chinese Communists instituted the "national 12-year scientific plans," they considered the history of the Republic of China a priority task, ranking it after modern Chinese history and Chinese new democratic revolutionary history. Mainland historians, whose study emphasized the Revolution of 1911, had previously published eight books on "Collection of Materials on Modern Chinese History—the Revolution of 1911." Some historians focused their study on the Revolution of 1911 and wrote books about it. Included were Li Shu's "Chinese Politics Before and After the Revolution of 1911," Chen Hsu-lu's "The Revolution of 1911" and Wu Yu-chang's "The 1911 Revolution." Some articles and memoirs were written by the people of the period of the 1911 Revolution. All of these were materials for the first part of the history of the Republic of China. In 1961, the 50th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, Tung Pi-wu proposed to write the history of the Republic of China and revise the history of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1971, Chou En-lai advanced a publication plan at a "meeting on national publication works," and in 1972 the "History of the Republic of China" was included in the plan. In the same year Li Hsin and others accepted the assignment of writing the "History of the Republic of China." A "Research Section on the History of the Republic of China" was set up in the "Institute of Modern History" under the "Academy of Social Sciences." There were fifty persons in the section specializing in the history of the Republic of China. Li Hsin and others advanced a plan for the writing that included three books of materials: chronicles of the Republic of China, "Notables of the Republic of China" (including biographies of about 1,000 persons and a biographical dictionary of about 4,000 persons), as well as materials on special subjects (about 600 subjects with unlimited wordage). When sufficient materials had been accumulated, the writing of the "History of the Republic of China" began. There were to be three parts and six volumes: the first part on ''The Establishment of the Republic of China" (one volume, 1905-1912); the second part on "The Reactionary Rule of the Northern Warlords' Government" (two volumes, 1912-1928); and the third part on "The Reactionary Rule of the Kuomintang Government" (three volumes, 1927-1949). To facilitate the work of gathering materials and seeking opinions, the Chinese Communist "Chung Hwa Book Company" has published since 1973 a non-periodical "Collection of Materials on the History of the Republic of China" for internal use. Issues started with 4,000 copies and were increased to 8,000. Twenty-three issues had been published by the end of 1978 and six more were being prepared for the press. According to the work schedule announced by the Chinese Communists, the first draft of the chronicles before 1927 was completed and others have been in the process of writing year after year. It is estimated that most of the first draft could be completed by 1979 and the work printed by 1980. After revisions the books of chronicles would be published in 1983. Biographies were planned at the rate of a book annually. No work schedule was set for compilation of materials on special subjects. The first draft of the first part of the "History of the Republic of China" was prepared and then revised and did not go to press until 1979. The outline for the second part has been approved and compilation is ready to start. The third part was scheduled for initiation in 1980. The whole work probably cannot be completed until 1985. According to the first volume's appendix, "Notables of the Republic of China" comprises three parts: "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," a "Biographical Dictionary" and an "Index of People." More than fifty books will be published for these three parts. The choice of persons for "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China" was restricted to well known figures during the period from 1905, the year the Tung Meng Hui was established, to 1949. The criteria and range of choice are explained in the preface and appendix. But it is clear the choices express value judgments and are subjective. The preface first observes that in writing the "History of the Republic of China," it is necessary "to insist that Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought be regarded as principles while rejecting the conventional approach to history of Chinese feudal times." Several points are then proposed: 1. Guidance of Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought. Biographies must have sufficient materials and be studied seriously. Writing should start only when the historian has a conceptualization of the subject's life, a proper judgment of the subject's words and deeds, and when conceptualization and judgment equate with Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought. 2. Narrative writing rather than critical biography. The correct point of view should be expressed through facts. Historians should not depart from the facts and comment too extensively. 3. Truth and reliability. Facts must be checked repeatedly and some will require investigation and research. All statements must be factual. 4. Presentation of a subject's overall impression together with emphasis and characteristics. Accomplishments must be presented honestly but must not be in the form of a journal or chronology. 5. Writing should be in vernacular Chinese used with dignity. Unnecessary quotations should be avoided and sources clearly stated. Except for the first, the five points are not objectionable. But a reading of the first volume of "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China" reveals many criticisms and numerous historical distortions. The biggest problem of the Chinese Communists in compiling the "History of the Republic of China" is their lack of historical materials. Time and again they rely on Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought, using this view to explain history, including people, things and events. This makes their history totally subjective and basically doctrinaire. The initial volume of "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," which contains the biographies of 65 persons, is the first published book in the series on the "History of the Republic of China." Some articles are by two writers. In other cases, one writer is responsible for several biographies. Contents of the biographies give clues to the motives and intentions of the Chinese Communists in compiling the "History of the Republic of China": First, the Chinese Communists have exaggerated the importance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought. Based on their directive that "history must serve politics," they have taken Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought as their guideline. They try to place modern Chinese history, the period of greatest change in all Chinese history, in the framework of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought. Second, they have attempted to give their regime the stamp of "legitimacy" by distorting history. According to the outline of the "History of the Republic of China" as set forth in the preface of "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," the third part is "The Reactionary Rule of the Kuomintang Government." The Chinese Communists describe the rule of the National Government after 1927 as "reactionary." In the "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," they equate the history of the National Government with that of the government of the Northern Warlords, the bogus government of Wang Ching-wei in Nanking during the War of Resistance Against Japan and even some local governments that opposed the National Government in several rebellions before the War of Resistance. Their intention is to obliterate the historical importance of the Northward Expedition of the National Government and to disparage the historical reality and legitimate position of the government of the Republic of China as a central government which effectively ruled the whole country. Third, they have used the established approach of the Chinese in writing "dynastic history," scheming to imply the termination of the Republic of China in writing such a history. In the preface, they say: "It is necessary and possible to explain the rise and fall of the last dynasty of Chinese exploitative society the Republic of China from the viewpoint of Marxism." This means the Chinese Communists consider the Republic of China as another dynasty beginning with the 1911 Revolution and terminating in 1949. They negate the historical situation of the government of the Republic of China after 1949 in the free bastion of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. Even more serious, they try to prevent the billion mainland compatriots and more than 20 million overseas Chinese from aspiring to join with the national magnet—the Republic of China—in terms of history, culture, ethics and democracy. Fourth, they have stressed the role that the Communists played from 1911 to 1949. They untruthfully represent the Kuomintang as not paying much attention to the mass movement of workers and farmers. They claim Dr. Sun Yat-sen didn't do so until he was influenced by the Communists. They say and reiterate that "with the help of the Chinese Communists, Dr. Sun Yat-sen reformed the Kuomintang, set up the revolutionary government at Kwangchow" and adapted the "three policies of uniting with the Soviet Union, uniting with the Communists and helping workers and farmers." They falsely maintain that Dr. Sun Yat-sen's proposals to summon the national assembly and terminate rule by warlords, together with his advocacy of abolishing the unequal treaties and opposing imperialism in foreign affairs originated with the Chinese Communists and were then accepted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. History contradicts their claim that "the revolutionary government at Kwangchow launched the Northward Expedition, as a result of Chinese Communist pressure." Looking at history, the Soviet Communists found that circumstances in China were not suitable for the development of Communism. So they ordered the Chinese Communists to join the Kuomintang individually in order to sow disruption and seize revolutionary leadership from within. This conspiracy was set forth in a resolution of the "third plenary session" of the Chinese Communist party. The Chinese Communists planned to divide the Kuomintang into leftist and rightist factions and infiltrate the leftists with their own people. This was the strategy of Michael Borodin, the representative of the Soviet Union and the Third International. The Chinese Communists regarded the central headquarters of the Kuomintang as a leftist organization and the Kwangchow local headquarters as a rightist one, and they secretly plotted to pit the two headquarters against each other. Borodin directed the Chinese Communists to attack Hu Han-min. Liao Chung-kai and others in the name of membership of the Kuomintang, accusing them of "betraying the party." This was supposed to split the KMT and give the Communists opportunity to take over management of party affairs. The Communists tried to help KMT members they wanted to use and who could be used. KMT leaders who were opposed or who could not be used were defamed, slandered and maliciously prevented from taking a place in party or society. The Chinese Communists tried to manipulate civic bodies, and when they could not, they sought to destroy them. The Chinese Communists followed the Communist International's unreasonable instructions to oppose and sabotage the Northward Expedition. As they failed to sabotage the Expedition and government troops scored one victory after another, they changed their policy and tried to take advantage, of the success. Their opposition was based on lack of strength and inadequate preparations to seize revolutionary leadership. They also feared the growing power of the "centralists" of the Kuomintang. They sought to curb centralist expansion and force this group to veer leftward and attack the rightists. The Chinese Communist repeated claim that they backed the Northward Expedition is completely erroneous. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen, believing that the warlords were falling out with each other, wanted to undertake another Northward Expedition, the Chinese Communists not only opposed it but demanded that the Kuomintang scrap the Kwangchow government. Fifth, the Communists decline to recognize Dr. Sun Yat-sen's contribution to the Chinese revolution and try to use him as a front in their own bid for revolutionary leadership. The first volume of "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China" said that Dr. Sun Yat-sen was a predecessor of "the democratic revolution by the capitalist class," a great democratic revolutionary and the creator of the Republic of China. They pretend that the Chinese Communists succeeded to Dr. Sun's revolutionary party and that their leaders are successors to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Sixth, the Chinese Communist assessment of modern Chinese figures depends on whether these people opposed Communism. In "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China," those who were ideologically pro-Communist or who spoke out for Communism are treated favorably. Those who were firmly and actively anti-Communist or who supported the government of the Republic of China are denigrated and even libeled with various political charges. Chiang Kai-shek is described as "a new rising warlord," "an incarnation of the old establishment," "the tool of the warlords" and "the enemy of the people." His "party purification movement" is referred to as the "anti-revolution rebellion" or "rebellious revolution." His position in Chinese history is totally rejected. Hu Han-min, who was strongly opposed to the Communists and advocated party purification, is libeled as "one of the criminal planners of the Kuomintang's anti-revolution in Nanking." All of the anti-Communist figures in the book are viciously defamed. There is no objective assessment. Seventh, the Communists distort history and create false images of themselves. Three examples may be cited: (1) The Chinese Communists regard the 1936 "Sian Rebellion" as the turning point from civil war to the resistance against Japan and claim the incident was settled peacefully because of the "correct advocacy" of the Chinese Communists and the "common efforts" by Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng. Actually, the Chinese Communists sought to draw Chang Hsueh-liang and his followers into their united front, but in the rebellion and its settlement Chang made the decisions and the Communists had no influence. Chang changed his attitude because he read Chiang Kai-shek's diary and was convinced of the Generalissimo's resolution in resisting the Japanese. He then returned to Nanking with Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists and Yang Hu-cheng objected to Chang's decision. But Chang stuck to his guns and the incident that frightened everyone at home and abroad was resolved peaceably. (2) The Chinese Communists claim that the "Chungshan Ship Incident" of 1926 was engineered by Chiang Kai-shek himself. In actuality, the Chinese Communists began making preparations in January of 1926 to "dump Chiang" and hasten their bid for revolutionary leadership. He was regarded as the sole obstacle to their "proletarian revolution." The rebellion aboard the Chungshan was to be the last step in the anti-Chiang conspiracy. Communists planned to hold Chiang as a hostage and then send him to Moscow. The chief conspirator, Li Chih-lung, was acting director of the Naval Bureau and a Communist. He forged an order instructing Chiang to return from Kwangchow (Canton) to the Whampoa Military Academy aboard the ship. The Communists planned to send Chiang to the Soviet Union via Vladivostok. The conspiracy became known. The Kwangchow garrison commander declared martial law and arrested Li Chih-lung. After the insurrection, the Chinese Communists defended themselves by denying their complicity. In fact, the leading role in the incident was played by Li Chih-lung, a Communist. To evade their responsibility, the Chinese Communists claimed "Li Chih-lung was punished for being a Communist and was placed under surveillance." In the beginning of the Chungshan case, the Communists expressed doubt about Li Chih-lung's motives. Stepanov, then Soviet military adviser in Kwangchow, reported to the Soviet embassy in Peiping that the "Chungshan ship rebellion" was generated by the Soviet advisers and accused the Chinese Communists of making mistakes. He exposed their conspiracy and faulty operations, including the monopolization of KMT headquarters, manipulation of the worker and peasant movement, ganging up for clandestine and illegal activities, the creation of schism and the infiltration of the military. (3) The repeated emphasis on the role of the Chinese Communists in the "Kwangchow Merchants Organization Incident" is inconsistent with most of the facts. In 1924, the British imperialists based at Hongkong clandestinely armed the Kwangchow Merchants Organization to obstruct the Northward Expedition by troops of the National Revolution. Dr. Sun Yat-sen ordered disarming of the organization. The Kwangchow revolutionary government was thus consolidated. But "Guide Weekly," a Communist organ, made much of the incident and fiercely attacked the Kuomintang. It claimed the "Kwangchow Merchants Organization Incident" was "a spectacular example of bloody assault on the revolutionary government by both the KMT rightists and mercenaries employed by the imperialist compradores." KMT rightists were accused of colluding with the mercenaries of the imperialist compradores. The truth is that the incident was never linked to the Kuomintang in any way. It was instigated by the British imperialists and put down by the Kuomintang. "Biographies of Notables of the Republic of China" nevertheless falsely accuses the "KMT rightist Hu Han-min and the reactionary warlord Fan Shih-sheng of secretly conspiring with the merchant organization and attempting to urge compromise on the revolutionary forces." The Communists claim further that they persuaded Dr. Sun Yat-sen to suppress the rebels and end the incident quickly. The KMT rightists are blamed for causing the incident and the Communists are given credit for concluding it. These are only three examples of history's distortion by the Chinese Communists. There are many others. The purpose of the Chinese Communists in writing the "History of the Republic of China" is to conceal the truth. Their viewpoint is subjective and without any basis for judging between truth and falsity or right and wrong. The objective is political; white becomes black and fabrications are substituted for reality. The Communists seek to destroy Chinese tradition and oppose moral standards and ethical culture. Their twisting of facts and history is illustrated in the vicious criticism of Confucius while praising Chin Shih Huang (the First Emperor, 246-214 B.C., who unified China under the Chin Dynasty); their reckless acceptance of the Chih-mei (bandits rampant toward the end of the West Han Dynasty of 206 B.C.-8 A.D.); and the embracing of Huang Chao (the bloodthirsty leader of a rebellion during the T'ang Dynasty). History presents the lifestream of a nation. Without understanding of the past, the present will not exist; without awareness of the present, the future will not materialize. History is also a mirror. People can judge the present in the light of the past. So history assesses the past to help create and foretell the future. Another significant function of history is to provide people with a sense of common identification and vitality. The influence of history is such that a few malicious people regard it as a tool to win fame through cheating or otherwise serving evil purposes. Historical data are often stolen, transformed or misrepresented. Historians are persecuted or purged. History is distorted and abused. This may not be too serious in a free and open society but can make a tremendous difference in a closed and totalitarian society. Authoritarian rulers know history will help provide the orthodoxy to stabilize their regimes. They remove anything unfavorable to themselves and rewrite history to meet their requirements. They do not desist until they have altered the historical consciousness of the people, wiped out resistance and destroyed knowledge, courage and good intentions. After their usurpation of the mainland, the Communists planned to rewrite Chinese history and first chose to control historians and make them tools of their dictatorship. Since 1957, Mao Tse-tung's thought has become the directing principle of Chinese Communist history. The Communist so-called "new history" is more than a materialistic conception based on the thought of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. History must serve the proletarian revolution and class interest and provide the excuse of historical inevitability for the Communist dictatorship. In the fabrication process, the Communists distort facts, suppress data and arbitrarily divide and misconstrue history. They counterfeit data and even photographs for political purposes. A picture showing Mao Tse-tung lying in state at his memorial service was retouched. The "gang of four" (Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Wang Hong-wen and Yao Wen-yuan) attended the service but were erased from the picture after the gang's downfall. To serve his ambitions, Lin Piao replaced Ho Tzu-chen, Mao Tse-tung's wife, with his own image in a picture of Mao and Ho. The Chinese Communists have misrepresented facts and invented history to meet the needs of practical politics. In view of this record, the Chinese Communists clearly regard history as a tool or magic weapon. The dignity of objective history has been destroyed. Conscientious historians and Sinologists should be responsible for collecting evidence, discussing and distinguishing right from wrong, and submitting a fair judgment of the Chinese Communists' distortion of history and brainwashing of historians so as to uphold the dignity of historical objectivity. Every historian must have respect for his own work before he is qualified to criticize others. That is to say: — He should uphold objectivity. He should avoid the biases of "speculation," "dogmatism," "stubbornness" and "egoism" and never pervert history to swim with the tides of the times. — He should judge the credibility of historical data and embrace thorough research, meanwhile avoiding subjectivity and his own glorification through misrepresentation. — He should be farsighted and forceful in his writing. He should never judge on a basis of honors or slanders or temporary successes and failures. He should never be expedient or myopic. — He should be independent and not pattern himself on others or follow in their footsteps. He should study the times before assessing historical personalities. He should not be faithless, ungrateful and so blind to greatness as to seek small flaws. He should not hail minor goodness to cover up major evil and conceal the doings of the wicked and the vicious from the thousands of generations to come. He should "write history without distortion," "gain meaning from history" and safeguard historical truth. Chinese history reveals many historians who obstinately stuck to their principles. Wen Tien-hsiang (1236-1282, the last prime minister of the Sung Dynasty) spoke movingly of "the bamboo book of history by Tai Shih of Chi" (a kingdom of the Period of Spring and Autumn, 712-484 B.C.). In the 25th year of Lu Hsiang Kung (King of Lu in 548 B.C.), there lived in the Kingdom of Chi a high official named Tsui Shu who killed his king, Chuang Kung. Tai Shih wrote on a slip of bamboo that "Tsui Shu killed his king." So Tai Shih was killed by Tsui Shu. One of Tai Shih's younger brothers wrote again "Tsui Shu killed his king;" the brother also was killed. Another younger brother of Tai Shih was still not afraid of the mighty Tsui Shu and he wrote "Tsui Shu killed his king." Tsui Shu gave up and killed no more. Nan Shih, a minor historian, believed Tai Shih and his brothers had been killed. He took out his bamboo slips and fearlessly prepared to carry out his duty as a historian. But he didn't have to proceed because he was told that the words "Tsui Shu killed his king" already had been recorded. Such historians were prepared to die in seeking the truth and establishing the criteria of morality. The younger brothers did not give up as their elders were killed. They courageously prepared to sacrifice themselves to protect principle and history. Their spirit is the model for historians. Chinese history's regard for truth and objectivity has been traditional for more than 2,000 years. Liu Chih-chi, a scholar of the T'ang Dynasty, said a good historian must be a man of learning, knowledge and ability. Chang Hsueh-chen, a scholar of Ch'ing, added the even more important quality of morality, which reflects the intentions of the historian. If a writer is not scrupulous in his intentions and is led astray by prejudice, his writings will be injurious to principle and justice. He cannot plumb the ways of nature and humankind, understand the changes from ancient to modern times, achieve the purposes of historical writing and become a good historian. Only when a historian sticks to truth and objectivity can he judge the distortion of history. He must base his conduct on the upholding of what is so. Every historian who is objective and truthful will be called on to oppose, refute and correct distortions, lies and untruths emerging from the forge of history.